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Supplier Selection Behavior under Uncertainty: Contextual and Cognitive Effects on Risk 
Perception and Choice  
 
ABSTRACT 
Buyers often make supplier selection decisions under conditions of uncertainty. While the 
analytical aspects of supplier selection are well developed, the psychological aspects are less so.  
This paper uses literature from supply chain management and behavioral decision theory to 
propose the following: While attributes of a purchase category (i.e., category difficulty, category 
importance, and contingent pay) influence risk perceptions, cognitive processes exist that 
additionally influence risk perceptions and affect a supply manager’s choice. We conducted a 
supplier selection behavioral experiment with practicing managers to test the model’s 
hypotheses. When the context involves an important or difficult sourcing category, higher risk 
perceptions exist that increase preferences for a supplier with more certain outcomes, even when 
that decision has a lower expected payoff.  However, the presence of contingent pay decreases 
risk perceptions through higher perceived supplier control. Also, we find that a manager’s risk 
propensity increases preferences for a supplier with less certain outcomes regardless of perceived 
risk. Our model and results provide a theoretical framework for further study into the cognitive 
aspects of supplier selection behavior and provides insight into decisional biases that practicing 
supply chain managers may be subject to. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Supplier selections have become important due to the increasing strategic role that suppliers play 
in a buying firm’s competitive landscape (Narasimhan & Talluri, 2009). Because supply 
managers in principal-agent situations make strategic supplier selections with long-term 
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consequences (Weber, Current, & Benton, 1991), researchers have examined how to mitigate the 
negative consequences of risk-related supply decisions (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Craighead, 
Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007). However, less is known about the cognitive 
antecedents to such decisions. Supplier selection is a decision with inherent uncertainty (Hult, 
Craighead, & Ketchen, 2010), with managers assessing each supplier’s risks and capabilities in 
meeting the buying firm’s sourcing objectives (Treleven & Schweikhart, 1988; Tomlin, 2006). 
Yet, such assessments rely on the perceptions and judgments of managers that are susceptible to 
contextual and cognitive biases (Amaral & Tsay, 2009; Ellis, Henry, & Shockley, 2010).  In this 
study, we focus on specific contextual and cognitive processes that influence supplier selection 
behavior under uncertainty, i.e., with variance in potential outcomes (Ghosh & Crain, 1993).  
Theories and models concerning supplier selection have been developed from a rational 
decision-making perspective to prescribe choices under various supply conditions (Choi & 
Hartley, 1996; McCutcheon & Stuart, 2000; Narasimhan, Talluri, & Mahapatra, 2006). More 
study is needed, however, into how supply conditions affect cognitive processes and thus supply 
management decisions (Mitchell, 1995). We investigate how contextual factors commonly 
experienced by supply managers, such as a purchased component’s strategic importance, its 
sourcing difficulty, and a manager’s compensation scheme influence risk perception and the 
subsequent effect on supplier selection (Olsen & Ellram, 1997; Villena, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Revilla, 2009). While some behavioral operations work has been done in this area (Ellis et al., 
2010), supply chain research has yet to examine how supplier selection is influenced by 
individual biases toward risk and control  (Langer, 1975; March & Shapira, 1987; Sitkin & 
Pablo, 1992). To understand the behavioral antecedents of supplier selection involving 
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uncertainty, we draw from behavioral decision theory to develop hypotheses for how sourcing 
context characteristics and managerial cognitive biases impact decision outcomes. 
The first major objective of this study is to test a cognitive model of determinants of a 
supplier selection behavior under uncertainty. Studies in behavioral decision theory have 
illuminated various factors that relate to decision-making behavior under uncertainty: examples 
include the effect of ambiguity (Fox & Tversky, 1995), effects of time (Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993), framing effects (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998), compensation effects (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998), risk propensity and risk perceptions effects (Slovic, 1987; Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992), and post-decisional control effects (Shapira, 1995; Harvey & Victoravich, 2009) on 
decision-making behavior. While behavioral operations literature has examined how subsets of 
these factors influence decisions (Keil, Depledge, & Rai, 2007; Ellis et al., 2010; Bendoly, 
2013), we are not aware of any study within the operations or supply chain management fields 
that has examined how both contextual and cognitive factors  affect risk perceptions and 
subsequent supplier selection behavior. Moreover, few supply chain studies incorporate the 
influence of perceptions of control on decision-making behavior (see Davis & Kottemann, 1994; 
Hunton, 1996; Bendoly, Thomas, & Capra, 2010b). This paper contributes by proposing a model 
incorporating these concepts and testing it with managers in a controlled experiment. 
The second major objective of this study is to extend research challenging the assumption 
that supply managers act as agents of a firm without personal biases or preferences affecting 
their decisions (Carter, Kaufmann, & Michel, 2007). While norms emanating from institutional 
and academic sources emphasize that supply chain managers base decisions on firm-specific 
objectives and criteria (Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero, & Patterson, 2009), behavioral decision 
theory emphasizes that perceptions and judgments are unavoidably biased (Gino & Pisano, 
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2008). Our study contributes by eliciting the influence of cognitive factors on supplier selection 
decisions under uncertainty, thus contributing to a growing body of literature that highlights the 
importance of behavioral issues in operations and supply chain management (Bendoly, Croson, 
Goncalves, & Schultz, 2010a; Bendoly & Eckerd, 2013).  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present the constructs in our model and 
hypothesize their interrelationships. Next, we discuss the methodology, including the 
experimental design, execution, and validity. We then present our model-testing approach and 
results. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude with theoretical and managerial implications 
and identify potential future research opportunities. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Complex cognitive processes are involved when a decision-maker is operating under conditions 
of high uncertainty. Environmental and organizational contexts interact with individual 
perceptions, as well as motivations for achievement and security, to influence the decision 
(Webster & Wind, 1972; Mitchell, 1995; Conchar, Zinkhan, Peters, & Olavarrieta, 2004). Our 
study uses known determinants of risk-taking behavior (see Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & 
Weingart, 1995) to develop a seven-construct model as shown in Figure 1. Construct definitions 
and references are provided in Table 1. In brief, we propose that sourcing category (i.e. sourcing 
category difficulty and importance) and personal incentives (contingent pay) influence a 
manager’s perceptions of risk and of supplier control, which along with the manager’s a priori 
risk propensity have effects on their selection risk taking. 
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----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here 
----------------------------------- 
Literature commonly assumes that the decision maker is a rational economic agent when 
selecting a supplier: they have knowledge of the supplier selection problem, they can create clear 
firm-based preferences amongst the choices of suppliers, they have the skills necessary to 
determine which supplier choice is optimal, and they are indifferent to difference supplier choice 
sets that are equivalent except for the way they are described (Rubinstein, 1998). There are 
several arguments to support this assumption.  First, supplier selection is an organizational-level 
decision made by one or more individuals acting as agents for the organization (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Second, because decision-makers are aware that negative consequences from their 
decision may be attributed to them, they are likely to engage in a rational manner (i.e., using all 
available information and being as objective as possible) to ensure that their decision process is 
auditable (March & Shapira, 1987).  Third, a supplier selection decision, which often occurs 
when an existing supplier does not exist, involves a decision-maker that has not previously 
interacted with the suppliers considered. Thus, emotional influences should be low so that the 
decision will be made rationally. Finally, application of the “Dutch Book” argument (Rubinstein, 
2012) to the supplier selection context would propose that an economic agent who does not act in 
a rational manner will make repeatedly poor decisions and their decisional authority will not 
survive.   
In reality, however, decision makers have bounded rationality, being affected by such 
causes as recency and primacy, framing, information processing limitations, and bias (Gino & 
Pisano, 2008).  Acknowledging this reality has moved decision theory to more explanatory and 
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useful models of decision making. Likewise, behavioral operations and supply management 
literature has advanced our understanding of operational decisions substantially with the 
incorporation of behavioral and bounded rational factors (Tiwana, Wang, Keil, & Ahluwalia, 
2007; Croson, Schultz, Siemsen, & Yeo, 2013). In our model, we explore two possible sources 
of bounded rationality. First, contingent pay, which creates personal incentives linked to the 
consequence of the decision, is posited to bias perceptions of control that impact rationality. 
Second, risk propensity, which is an individual attribute of the decision-maker that exists prior to 
the decision, is posited to bias supplier choice because supply managers will emphasize benefits 
and losses differently. 
From a rational economic agent perspective, supply managers will determine the optimal 
supplier choice by calculating the expected value of the different choice options (Narasimhan et 
al., 2006). Expected value can be expressed as a function of two factors—the probability of a 
particular outcome, and the magnitude of the outcome, or decision consequence (Schoemaker, 
1982). For example, if a supplier selection problem was based purely on cost, and supplier A had 
a 50 percent chance of reducing cost per unit by $10, while supplier B had a 25 percent chance of 
reducing cost per unit by $50, then a supply manager would choose supplier B because the 
expected reduction in cost per unit is greater for supplier B (0.25 x $50 = $12.50) than for 
supplier A (0.50 x $10 = $5.00). Risk is similarly conceptualized as the probability and 
magnitude of loss (Yates & Stone, 1992), and supply management models have commonly used 
this formulation to describe how decision-makers perceive risk and behave (Ellis et al., 2010; 
Ho, Xu, & Dey, 2010).  
We define the decision-maker’s risk perception as the overall assessment of the 
probabilities and magnitudes of potential losses associated with a supplier selection situation.  
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Sitkin and Pablo (1992) argue that risk perception is an underlying mechanism crucial to 
understanding decision-making behavior under uncertainty. That is, the level of risk perceived in 
a situation strongly determines risk behavior. Numerous managerial studies have found risk 
perception to be an important determinant of behavior (Pennings & Wansink, 2004; Klos, 2005; 
Forlani, Parthasarathy, & Keaveney, 2008). We propose that sourcing category, contingent pay, 
perceived supplier control, and risk propensity influence risk perceptions in a supplier selection 
problem. 
 
Sourcing Categories and Risk Perceptions 
The strategic sourcing of suppliers can involve significant uncertainty and consequences. 
Strategic sourcing often begins with classifying the component into a category based on its 
difficulty and importance (Kraljic, 1983; Olsen & Ellram, 1997) before determining what 
suppliers to select and what supplier strategies to use (Goldfeld, 1999; Monczka et al., 2009). 
Sourcing category importance and sourcing category difficulty are the bases for the popular 
classification of sourcing components by Kraljic (1983) into four categories: routine (low 
difficulty and low importance), bottleneck (high difficulty and low importance), leverage (low 
difficulty and high importance), and strategic (high difficulty and high importance). Because a 
supply strategy depends on the difficulty of the supply market and the strategic importance of the 
purchased product, the purchase category can frame the context for subsequent decisions.  
Our first hypothesis pertains to the difficulty of a sourcing category, which is influenced 
by characteristics of the component (i.e., product novelty and complexity), the supply market 
(e.g., suppliers’ power), and the environment (e.g., turbulence) (Olsen & Ellram, 1997). From a 
buying firm’s perspective, the novelty and the complexity of a sourcing category creates a 
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problematic sourcing context because of the uncertainties involved – e.g., uncertainties for 
manufacturability and for final product effects (Monczka et al., 2009). Similarly, high supplier 
power increases the dependency on the supplier for the purchase category (Crook & Combs, 
2007), raising the likelihood of scheduling problems and high switching costs for the buyer 
(Goldfeld, 1999). If a purchase category has low difficulty, it is relatively easy for supply 
managers to implement contingencies to decrease the impact of a potential supplier failure for 
that category. For example, changing to a different supplier or finding a temporary supplier are 
contingency strategies that can be easily executed for a purchase category with low difficulty. 
However, if a sourcing category has high difficulty, these contingencies may not be easy or even 
feasible, hence increasing supply managers’ perception of risk in the situation. In other words, 
sourcing for categories with high difficulty increase the perceived probability that problems will 
arise regardless of the supplier selected. Ellis et al. (2010) find that a component’s technological 
uncertainty and the thinness of the related supply market increase the perceived risk of 
component currently being supplied; in part because of an increased perception that disruptions 
are likely under these conditions.  Thus, 
H1: Sourcing category difficulty is positively associated with perceived risk. 
 
 In a supply context, the importance of a sourcing category represents strategic factors 
(i.e., the extent to which the purchase is part of the firm’s core competence) and economic 
factors (i.e., percentage of the purchase in total costs) (Olsen and Ellram, 1997). Important 
purchases typically have strong influences on company results and are critical to the business 
(Kraljic, 1983; Goldfeld, 1999). While important purchases present opportunities for greater 
rewards if there is a successful follow-through on such contracts, important purchases with 
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uncertain outcomes can have substantial consequences and can be associated with high risk 
(Bettman, 1973). In a supplier selection under uncertainty, if a sourcing category has low 
importance, then supply managers perceive the consequence, and thus risk, as lower because 
either slack exists in the need for the supply, or failures will not be as visible or impactful in the 
organization. Conversely, if a sourcing category is of high importance, then the consequence of a 
failure, and thus the risk, will be perceived as higher because a supply failure will impact a 
critical organizational need and, thus, be visible to many in the organization (Ellis et al. 2010).  
For example, when considering suppliers for a component that represents a large portion of 
product cost, uncertainty over future component prices could impact product margins. Thus, the 
supply manager making supplier selection might view or perceive this situation as threatening. 
Thus, 
H2: Sourcing category importance is positively associated with perceived risk. 
 
Effects of Contingent Pay  
Managers select suppliers on behalf of their company; they are agents taking risks for the firm 
while being compensated and governed by the firm. Because governance structures alone do not 
adequately predict decision making under uncertainty (Catanach & Brody, 1993), the behavioral 
agency model (BAM) was introduced to help “improve the predictive and explanatory value of 
agency-based models of executive risk-taking behavior” (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998, 
p.135). Compensation schemes tightly couple firm performance to agent consequences (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994). In BAM, much depends on the make-up of base and contingent pay. Base pay is 
the component of the total pay that is relatively more certain and more expected than contingent 
pay, which is more variable (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). BAM has recently been applied 
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to supply chain decision-making, where Villena et al. (2009) find that compensation schemes 
that increase threats to expected supply chain executive wealth reduce the willingness to make 
risky decisions. We extend this work to a supplier selection context. 
It is not uncommon for supply managers to have a contingent pay compensation scheme 
(Rossetti & Choi, 2005). Contingent pay in supply management typically relates to an incentive 
to improve a purchased part variance (PPV) metric. PPV exists when components are procured 
for an amount different than expected (Monczka et al., 2009). When supply managers succeed in 
securing supply sources below expected component costs, a favorable PPV occurs, saving the 
company money. One approach, therefore, to provide supply managers with contingent pay is to 
introduce compensation schemes that allocate bonuses for such cost savings. When such 
contingent pay does not exist, the supply manager will perceive that a positive outcome will not 
be rewarded, at least not immediately, and a negative outcome may lead to actions that threaten 
their base pay, which is their source of economic security. Thus, supply managers making a 
supplier selection under uncertainty will perceive risk as being relatively higher than a purely 
rational assessment would suggest.  Conversely, when contingent pay exists and is relatively 
high, the supply manager may perceive less of a threat to their expected wealth because the 
presence, or lack thereof, of the contingent pay does not impact their base salary. Therefore, 
based on the processes described in BAM we state the following hypothesis: 
H3: A higher proportion of contingent pay is associated with lower perceived risk. 
 
It is important to note that in formulating risk perceptions, decision-makers consider their 
ability to mitigate the consequences associated with a risk event after is has occurred. For 
example, in determining the consequences of going outside on a possibly rainy day, a person will 
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discount the negative effects of the rain on them if they know they can carry an umbrella. 
According to the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajze, 1991), perceived behavioral control (i.e. 
self-efficacy) positively affects the intent to act and action itself. As perceived behavioral control 
increases, an actor will be more likely to believe they have the skills and resources to succeed in 
their intended action. In the case of supplier selection, the intended action is to deliver positive 
benefits and avoid negative consequences associated with sourcing from a particular supplier, 
and part of the intended action is to mitigate the impact of risk events after the supplier selection 
decision has been made. Research confirms that illusions of controlling the consequences of a 
decision have a strong impact on the decision-maker’s evaluation of those consequences 
(McKenna, 1993).  
Shapira (1995) extended this concept to managerial decision making by describing how 
managers see themselves as actively influencing the uncertain outcomes associated with a 
decision. Managers often perceive risk taking not as a one-point-in-time decision, but rather as a 
process-over-time: If things go wrong they can change the course of action in order to remedy 
problems after the decision has been made. Managerial illusions of control can lead to 
inappropriately high expectancies of personal success (Langer, 1975) and can be induced 
through offering choices, reordering outcomes, familiarizing tasks, providing information, and 
offering feigned involvement (Presson & Benassi, 1996). Shapira (1995) calls this the belief in 
post-decisional control, where a manager perceives an ability to influence the uncertain 
outcomes of a decision. Indeed, Bendoly et al. (2010b) found evidence for the argument that 
perceptions of control in projects increased the value that a manager  places on social 
interactions because of a tendency to see more opportunities in those interactions. In our study, 
perceived supplier control relates to the supply managers’ beliefs in their abilities to influence 
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the consequences of an initial supplier selection – such as obtaining rush orders during supply 
disruptions or negotiating supplier concessions if costs increase. 
Our model contributes by integrating BAM with perceptions of post-decisional control 
and risk (March & Shapira, 1987). Dunford et al. (2010) recently find that contingent pay (i.e., 
offering stock options) positively influences perception of control (i.e., the expectancy that effort 
will influence stock performance), regardless of one’s ability to control the situation. This 
implies that Shapira’s (1995) post-decisional control concept can be integrated with BAM. That 
is, a high proportion of contingent pay will increase perceptions of control because of the 
impression given that outcomes can be influenced. Unlike base pay, contingent pay is more 
dependent on the decision maker’s efforts (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), thus giving a sense 
of control.  
H4: A high proportion of contingent pay increases perceived supplier control.  
 
Influences on Perceived risk in Supplier Selection 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) argue that risk perception is an underlying mechanism crucial to 
understanding decision-making behavior under uncertainty. That is, the level of risk perceived in 
a situation strongly determines risk behavior. Numerous managerial studies have found risk 
perception to be an important determinant of behavior (Pennings & Wansink, 2004; Klos, 2005; 
Forlani et al., 2008). We propose two constructs in our integrated model that influence risk 
perceptions in a supplier selection situation: perceived supplier control and risk propensity. 
Risk involves an uncertainty as to whether unfavorable outcomes will occur (Yates & 
Stone, 1992). In a supplier selection situation, however, these unfavorable outcomes are not 
immediate. Unexpected disruptions or quality failures can happen many months into the 
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relationship. Thus, supply managers with strong beliefs that future events can be manipulated 
will not see potential negative consequences as likely to occur in supplier selection (Keil et al., 
2007). This is because of their belief that if things go awry, they can enact whatever influence 
they have within the decision context and avoid future problems (March & Shapira, 1987). For 
example, if there are warning signs relating to a potential supplier’s ability to meet delivery 
times, supply managers’ beliefs that this situation can be easily handled if it does occur will not 
preclude the supplier from being considered or even selected. In other words, the supply 
manager’s perceived control over the situation will downplay the potential risks associated with 
a supplier’s failure to meet delivery times, thus,  perceiving that unfavorable outcomes are less 
likely (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Accordingly, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H5: Perceived supplier control decreases perceived risk in a supplier selection situation.  
 
Managerial risk propensities can also influence the degree to which risk is perceived. In 
this study, risk propensity is assumed to be an exogenous, influential factor in how risks are 
evaluated and what risks are acceptable (Baird & Thomas, 1985; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 
1990; Ghosh & Ray, 1992). Individuals with differing risk propensities will read into and 
perceive the costs and benefits of selecting available suppliers differently. Decision-makers with 
high risk propensity focus on and weigh beneficial outcomes of situations more highly than 
detrimental outcomes, thus overestimating the probability of success relative to failure 
(Brockhaus, 1980; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). This decreases the perception of risk. In their study 
with student participants, Sitkin and Weingart (1995) find that risk propensity decreases the level 
of risk perceived in a race car hypothetical situation.  
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Supplier selection involves numerous competing factors with varying degrees of potential 
benefits and risks (Weber et al., 1991; Kull & Talluri, 2008). Suppliers may offer exceptional 
quality levels but could also possibly raise their prices (Min, 1994). Similarly, suppliers may 
guarantee lower prices but may not be able to provide supplies consistently. A supply manager’s 
role is highly analytical, typically involving planning, scheduling, and coordination of supplies. 
The role involves boundary spanning activities requiring the manager to work closely with 
customers, marketing, production, and sales departments to ensure smooth production operations 
(Fredendall, Hopkins, & Bhonsle, 2005). Supply managers’ decisions are consequential to a 
firm’s success and, in particular, supplier selection decisions can have major consequences 
because of the difficulty in predicting selected suppliers’ performance (Wouters et al., 2009). 
The demands of the role and the dynamic situation of the supply chain environment imply that 
supply managers cannot simply rely on their analytical skills but also need to draw on their 
personal judgment. While personal judgment can be influenced by supply chain experience for 
assessing the risks involved in a supplier selection situation, it is also susceptible to personal 
biases (Tazelaar & Snijders, 2013).  Specifically, supply managers’ tendencies toward risk (risk 
propensity) will influence their perception of risk.  
Sitkin and Weingart (1995) argue that risk propensity is an emergent property of an 
individual that is persistent but can change over time due to contextual factors. The supply chain 
environment is highly dynamic and is typically characterized by changes in purchase situations 
and process, prices of purchase categories and technological changes (Kaufman and Carter, 
2006). The dynamism of the supply environment and the uncertainty in predicting supplier 
selection outcomes make supply managers perceive risk differently depending on whether they 
lean toward accepting versus avoiding risk. Specifically, it is expected in a supplier selection 
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situation under uncertainty that supply managers with high risk propensities will evaluate the 
situation favorably, attending to the possibility of beneficial outcomes while downplaying the 
possibility of detrimental outcomes. Conversely, supply managers with low risk propensity will 
evaluate the situation unfavorably, attending to the possibility of negative outcomes in the 
situation like late deliveries while downplaying the likelihood of beneficial outcomes. Thus, we 
offer the following hypothesis. 
H6: Supply manager risk propensity decreases perceived risk in a supplier selection 
situation. 
 
Influences on Supplier Selection Risk Taking 
Our final two hypotheses describe why risk perception and risk propensity influence 
selection risk taking. Literature has suggested that higher perceived risk induces decision 
behavior toward less risk (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Kuhberger, 1998). A higher perception of 
risk in a situation should induce the decision maker to seek less risky, more certain alternatives. 
Ellis et al (2010) found that high supply disruption risk perceptions lead toward behavior that 
seeks new supply sources. Similarly, we view high perceived risk as prevalent in supplier 
selection decisions because of the uncertainty associated with predicting selected suppliers’ 
performance (Talluri, Narasimhan, & Nair, 2006; Wouters, Anderson, Narus, & Wynstra, 2009; 
Riedl, Kaufmann, Zimmermann, & Perols, 2013).  
Supply managers as agents to the firm are tasked with protecting the firm’s competitive 
position (Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 2004). As we noted above, a supply 
manager’s role spans many intra-organizational and inter-organizational boundaries. Thus, any 
major decision like supplier selection is likely to have major consequences on the firm and will 
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likely be guided by a careful assessment of the situation to protect the firm from threats to supply 
continuity (Craighead et al., 2007). If supply managers perceive high situational uncertainties, 
they will tend to avoid exacerbating the situation and choose a less risky, more certain supplier. 
This helps to minimize or avoid the potential negative impact that a risky supply source might 
have on the various stakeholders with whom the supply manager must contend. This also 
protects the supply manager’s interest as an agent for the company by reducing the likelihood of 
termination – i.e., employment risk (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). With a less risky 
supplier, certainty toward supplier capabilities is increased, thus, perceived threats to supplies are 
reduced and risks to the supply manager’s agency position are alleviated. 
H7: Perceived risk in a supplier selection situation decreases the likelihood of selecting a 
risky supplier. 
 
Supply chain risk studies make the assumption that managers’ decision-making behaviors 
are primarily based on situational and contextual factors, such as product- or market-specific 
factors (Ellis et al., 2010), compensation schemes (Villena et al., 2009), or risk identification 
mechanisms (Neige, Rotaru, & Churilov, 2009). However, management literature has 
acknowledged that personal risk propensities are influential in managerial decisions (Sitkin & 
Pablo, 1992; Ghosh & Ray, 1997). Sitkin and Weingart (1995) conceptualized risk propensity as 
an emergent property of the decision maker, thus, can change over time. Risk propensities of 
supply managers are influenced by their personal characteristics. It is pertinent to note that the 
supply chain organization is characterized by market mechanisms and structures that encourage 
profit maximization. This can socialize supply managers to be analytical, decisive, and 
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achievement oriented individuals, which influences and is influenced by their risk propensity 
(Saini & Martin, 2009).  
We argue that the risk propensity of a supply manager is likely to influence the 
manager’s supplier selection decision. For instance,  supply managers may choose riskier options 
because of their willingness to accept the risks for the possibility of rewards (Lee, 1997). Indeed 
studies have found that certain managers are more predisposed to accept risks than others 
(Stewart & Roth, 2001). This predisposition has a strong relation to personality (Nicholson, 
2005) since people respond to situations with potential threats differently. This explains why 
certain people engage in high risk business ventures and innovations while others do not (Stewart 
& Roth, 2001). While supplier selection decisions are associated with potential risks like the 
failure of selected suppliers to meet delivery and price objectives, such decisions can also be 
rewarding. For example suppliers can deliver cost advantages through sourcing low cost 
components or help to improve a firm’s innovation performance. In supplier selection situations, 
we expect that supply managers with low risk propensities will tend to deemphasize these 
opportunities, instead emphasizing the likelihood and magnitude of detrimental outcomes, and 
more likely avoiding risky suppliers. By contrast, supply managers with high risk propensities 
will assess the situation favorably by emphasizing the reward aspect of the decision and, 
therefore, will be more likely to make riskier decisions than those with low risk propensities. 
Accordingly, we offer the following hypothesis.  
H8: Supply manager risk propensity increases the likelihood of selecting a risky supplier.  
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METHODOLOGY 
In order to test our hypotheses and ensure that causal inferences can be made regarding the 
factors of interest (Martin, 2004), we structured a behavioral experiment with practicing 
managers in accordance with similar supply chain research (Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 2010). A 
behavioral experiment was preferred because it allows the manipulation of events that capture 
participant responses to different scenarios. Our approach randomly assigned participants to 
different one-shot, hypothetical, supplier selection scenarios. Participants were asked to make a 
selection and answer questions about the scenarios and themselves. Our experimental design 
follows recommendations by Rungtusanatham, Wallin, and Eckerd (2011). Specifically, our pre-
design stage assured alignment with previous studies on decision-making behavior under 
uncertainty (Puto, 1987; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) and that sourcing categories followed 
descriptions commonly found in supply management literature (Kraljic, 1983; Olsen & Ellram, 
1997; Monczka et al., 2009). In our design stage, we assured the common text for the contextual 
setting was invariant across all scenarios and avoided demand characteristics – i.e., avoiding cues 
as to the expectations of the experiment (Martin, 2004). Also, in our post-design stage a pretest 
was conducted with business undergraduate students from a large research university in order to 
refine the experimental design, improve the measurement model, and assure manipulation 
validity (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). Additionally we simplified the description of the 
experimental factors as much as possible and presented the purchase categories in a 2X2 matrix 
to ensure that responding managers would have no difficulty understanding the meaning of the 
related constructs, thus, ensuring validity. 
To ensure that voluntary participants served as suitable proxies for real-world decision-
making and to ensure the generalizability (i.e., external validity) of results, all participants were 
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practicing managers with managerial experience from different industries (Bachrach & Bendoly, 
2011). Professionals with supply chain experience were purposefully sought. Enticement was 
given by informing them of the general research topic that most found interesting. They were 
also informed that participation will involve a hypothetical scenario and that their individual 
scores relative to other responses would be anonymous. Participants were affiliated with the 
university through industry-university consortiums. A total of 119 useable responses were 
collected over two months, giving about 20 respondents per simultaneously estimated structural 
parameter, exceeding similarly designed research (Bolt, Killough, & Koh, 2001; Wang & 
Benbasat, 2008). Over 95 percent of the participants were or had been a supply chain 
professional (i.e., actively involved in purchasing, operations, and/or logistics). Additionally, 93 
percent of participants had over five years of work experience, with 60 percent having eleven 
years or more. Most participants were over 35 years old, and 73 percent were male. A range of 
industries was represented (37 percent manufacturing and 63 percent services), with the most 
participants from the healthcare sector (32 percent).  
An anonymous, online-survey approach was used to aid external validity and avoid 
Hawthorne effects from a laboratory environment (Gould, 2001). Participants could not re-enter 
the survey once departed. Because we purposely sought participants with supply chain 
experience, random selection was not possible. However, to avoid confounding the data, we used 
an online tool to randomly assign treatment conditions to participants (Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002). This helped ensure causal interpretation by removing possible systemic 
differences across treatments caused by extraneous factors (Perdue & Summers, 1986).  
 
Structure of Experiment 
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The experiment consisted of four steps. In the first step, managers were presented with an 
informed consent as prescribed by institutional review board (IRB) requirements for human-
subject experiments. The general nature and intent of the experiment were given (i.e., to improve 
understanding of supplier selection processes) without alluding to uncertainty in decision-making 
to avoid demand characteristics. Demographic questions were also part of this section. Next, 
participants were required to acknowledge that they had read a statement that informed them that 
they will next be presented with a common way to segment sourcing categories and to take their 
time reviewing the categories; this emphasized the sourcing category importance and context 
difficulty manipulation. 
 
Manipulations 
In the second step, the basis for the first manipulation was given. Managers were given 
the information with a 2X2 table of importance and difficulty, with category names in each cell 
as shown in Figure 2. Participants were requested to read the following statement: 
“Selecting suppliers for a product or service can be complicated. Tools can help structure 
information so that effective decisions can be made. One common tool is called the 
‘portfolio analysis matrix’ that helps segment purchases into four types: strategic, routine, 
leverage, and bottleneck. Decisions can be made based on the importance and difficulty 
of the purchase. Importance is based on the potential value in terms of total spend or 
strategic impact, while difficulty is based on the challenges in procurement in terms of 
complexity or riskiness.” 
The third step involved presenting the hypothetical situation (an example is shown in 
Figure 3) to the managers. Participants were first asked to consider themselves as a mid-level 
buyer making a long-term selection between computer-component Suppliers A and B that will 
deliver somewhat frequently, but that the manager has minimal post-decisional control over the 
decision. This low degree of control is constant across all scenarios and was emphasized in order 
to detect illusions-of-control as manipulated in the experiment. Also, using a mundane 
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“computer component” avoids affective influences, yet is familiar and generic enough to both 
service and manufacturing employees to be applicable to various spend categories.  
To differentiate between the uncertainties of outcomes associated with each supplier, all 
the scenarios stated that the hypothetical purchasing company emphasizes cost and delivery, and 
that these two dimensions should be used to select Supplier A or B. We avoided using quality 
because of its potential affective influence (Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999). Regarding cost, 
supplier-A guarantees a total price reduction of five percent over the duration of the contract, 
while Supplier-B is pursuing unproven process innovations that have an even chance of lowering 
prices by twenty percent over the contract duration or not at all. The expected value for selecting 
Supplier-A is a five percent price reduction, with no uncertainty, while the expected value for 
selecting Supplier-B is a ten percent price reduction with associated uncertainty. Thus, according 
to our definition, choosing Supplier-B would be an indicator of increased selection risk taking. 
Regarding delivery, Supplier-A always has about one out of ten orders delivered late, while 
Supplier-B mostly delivers on-time except for a couple of months where four out of ten orders 
are late. The expected value for selecting Supplier-A is ten percent late delivery with no 
uncertainty, while the expected value for selecting Supplier-B is near zero percent late delivery 
with some uncertainty. Thus, according to our definition, choosing Supplier-B for this reason 
also indicates increased selection risk taking. Thus, both dimensions point to Supplier-B as 
having more downside risk and more upside potential.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 & 3 here 
----------------------------------- 
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Eight scenarios were randomly assigned to induce three factor manipulations: four 
categories representing low-high conditions of importance and difficulty, and two compensation 
schemes representing low-high proportions of contingent pay (see Table 2). To induce the 
sourcing category manipulation, managers were informed of the type of category by stating its 
label (i.e., routine, bottleneck, leverage, or strategic) and then reiterating the attributes described 
in Figure 2 regarding its level of importance and difficulty (see Table 3). To induce proportion of 
contingent pay, managers were informed of their hypothetical base salary and bonus 
compensation; with a larger bonus relative to base pay inducing a higher proportion of 
contingent pay. For high contingent pay, the manipulation was “it is important to note buyers are 
paid a mid-level base salary, but with bonuses available if they show significant cost-reductions 
and service improvements year-over-year.” For low contingent pay, the manipulation was “it is 
important to note that buyers are paid a high base salary with no bonuses.” Lastly, managers 
were required to acknowledge that they understand the basic supplier differences, type of 
purchases, and degree of involvement before being able to go to the next section. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Measures of Key Variables 
The fourth step consisted of psychometric questions about managers’ perceptions of situational 
characteristics and required participants to make specific supplier selections and give the 
rationale for their choices. Because our participants were practicing managers, we limited the 
number of measurement items to avoid fatigue while assuring content validity by adapting items 
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from previous studies to our context (Gould, 2001). Measures were also included for 
manipulation and other validity checks (discussed below). To prevent common method variance, 
reverse coding was employed and questions for each factor were dispersed to avoid spatial 
proximity bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Participants are asked to rate 
their level of agreement to a set of statements based on the scenario information (1=strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The a priori measurement model’s preliminary 10 items, which had 
been refined from the aforementioned pretest, was assessed using confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). We found one item necessitated removal because of poor psychometric properties. At 
least two-items per construct exist, providing an acceptable measurement structure with 
acceptable reliabilities and reflecting the theoretical content (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 
1998, p.598). This measurement structure aligns with other decision science research with 
similar reliability (Case & Scott, 1998; Kathuria, Murugan, & Magid, 1999). The details of the 
measurement items, as well as their reliabilities and sources, are shown in Table 4 and are 
discussed in the results section. 
We note the final dependent variable selection risk taking is measured using continuous 
and dichotomous items. The continuous measure that is used in the analysis is based on a Likert 
scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). The binary measure asks participants to select 
between Supplier-A and Supplier-B based on the scenarios and to provide a rationale for their 
decisions. This binary measure is included for triangulation and validation purposes. 
 
Control and Validation Variables 
In addition to the key variables, additional data were collected for validation and control 
variables. The following demographic variables were collected because of potential biases 
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toward risk taking: gender (Harris, Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006); age (Nicholson, 2005); industry 
context (Miller & Chen, 2004); understanding (Anderson & Mellor, 2009); and experience 
(Halpern-Felsher, Millstein, Ellen, Adler, Tschann, & Biehl, 2001). Experience is especially 
important as individuals’ behavior towards risk can change over time (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). 
Previous studies note the importance of experience because decision makers draw from past 
successful decision strategies (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Riedl et al., 2013). In particular, the role 
of experience when operating in turbulent, uncertain, and dynamic environments, such as in 
supplier selection situations, has been recognized (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Tazelaar & Snijders, 
2013). Supply managers with more years of experience in relevant supply chain activities will be 
able to recognize or spot potentially problematic suppliers more than managers with relatively 
less years of supply chain experience. In this study, we measured the number of years of supply 
chain experience because as managers gain more years of supply chain experience, which likely 
includes supplier selections, they are more likely to make well-informed decisions, influencing 
supplier selection risk taking. Therefore, years of supply chain experience is of particular interest 
in our model. 
Finally, responses to psychological questions pertaining to personal purchasing risk 
propensity from consumer behavior research (Raju, 1980) were collected to assess for 
confounding effects (Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011). Personal purchasing risk propensity questions 
include: “I would buy products that I only know a lot about to avoid making a mistake”, and “If I 
were to buy a mobile phone, I would buy only a well-established brand”. These are used in our 
model validation. 
 
Validity Checks 
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Our pre-test on two different samples of students (those with prior knowledge of purchase 
categories as described and classified in the study (Olsen and Ellram, 1997) versus those without 
prior knowledge) reveals no significant difference in relation to key variables suggesting a 
common understanding of how we described and presented the factors used in the experimental 
design. The pretests with business student participants also revealed that the participants’ 
decisions did not appear to take into consideration or be affected by the proportion of contingent 
pay manipulation. Although we changed the wording and emphasis in the managerial study, to 
verify that our intended manipulation is transparent and interpretable, we also included the 
following items in the survey for a manipulation check: “My income will vary based on my 
decision” and “The supplier I select will affect my personal wealth,” with a significant difference 
between low and high proportion of contingent pay (= 2.62, t=10.54, p<0.001). To assure 
Supplier-B was associated with more uncertainty or risk, we assessed the rationales that 
participants provided for their selection and found 80 percent differentiated Supplier-B as the 
more uncertain and/or more risky (see Appendix-A for the details on our text analysis). 
To assess internal validity, checks were conducted to ensure that no confounding effects 
existed with the treatment level to inadvertently have a direct impact on the unexpected factors in 
the conceptual model (i.e., risk propensity and perceived supplier control). Factor item values 
were averaged to form factor scores. The t-tests revealed no significant differences between low-
high manipulations of the three factor treatments: sourcing category importance (t-values ranged 
from -0.918 to 0.411); sourcing context difficulty (t-values ranged from -.905 to 1.012); and 
proportion of contingent pay (t-values ranged from -0.024 to 0.452). In summary, no 
confounding effects were detected. 
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Finally, to assess external validity, participant and ecological validity checks were 
performed (Gould, 2001). Checks were conducted to detect if participant industrial affiliation, 
personal purchasing risk propensity, value of money, and other demographic characteristics were 
confounding the experiment. Industry biases were assessed using a similar approach as the 
confounding check above. No highly significant (p>0.05) differences between manufacturing 
and services were found (t-values ranged from -1.315 to 1.821) although risk propensity was 
higher in services than manufacturing at p=0.071. Checks between healthcare and non-healthcare 
similarly revealed no highly significant differences (t-values ranged from -1.668 to 0.040) 
although risk propensity was higher in healthcare than in non-healthcare at p=0.098. We also 
checked to see if manipulations were biased by personal purchasing risk propensity, and no 
significant differences were found. Finally, assessments regarding supply chain position, work 
experience, age, and gender showed no significant factor mean differences. In sum, following the 
basic tenets of rigorous behavioral experimentation in operations management research, we 
validated the experimental design to support the generalizability of our subsequent analysis. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We followed the two-step method for analyzing structural equations models (SEM), where we 
first refined and assessed a measurement model for appropriate psychometric properties, and 
then tested a structural model for appropriate fit and hypothesis testing using the structural 
parameters (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). An approach for SEM testing in experimental designs 
was followed where the estimation method uses univariate tests of treatment variables (Bagozzi 
& Yi, 1989).  
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Interestingly, we found that managers in general behave in a risk-averse manner. That is, 
73.5 percent of managers selected Supplier-A which is associated with low uncertainty. This is 
the case even though Supplier-B has a higher expected value. Previous studies have found that 
managers in different functions display differing risk-taking behavior, and in this situation most 
managers preferred the safer supplier even though the expected value of Supplier-B was higher. 
This result is explored further in the discussion section. It should be noted that this pattern held 
regardless of current supply chain position, work experience, age, and gender.  
 
 
Measurement Model 
The CFA conducted used a mean-covariance structure in line with Bagozzi and Yi (1989) in 
EQS. Only the continuous, measured factors were included at this stage since the binary, 
manipulation factors were to be entered subsequently. The fit statistics show adequate fit with X
2
 
= 26.283 (26) p=0.447, CFI = 0.999, GFI=0.957, RMSEA = 0.010 (0.000, 0.077). All loadings 
are significant and above 0.500 (see Table 4). We find that dispersing the factor-items in the 
survey avoided method bias. Specifically, the Harman's one factor assessment shows just 31% of 
variance explained. Furthermore, a CFA allowing items to load on a latent common methods 
factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003) is not significantly different (2=14.7 (12) p>.10), does not 
change structural parameter significances, and only modifies the significant parameter values on 
average by 2%. In addition, adequate construct reliabilities above the 0.5 threshold (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981) are achieved, with Cronbach alphas near the preferred values. Further tests also 
showed acceptable convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Item-level 
descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 5.  
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----------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
----------------------------------- 
Hypothesis Tests 
The Bagozzi and Yi (1989) approach uses a mean-covariance structure to create a system of 
equations to test hypotheses among dummy manifest variables representing low-high levels 
among the three experimental factors – sourcing category importance, sourcing context difficulty 
and contingent pay. The goal is to focus on the means, instead of covariances, in order to analyze 
the hypothesized experimental effects on risk perception and perceived supplier control. The 
benefit of this approach is that it simultaneously tests the nomological network of effects among 
the factors. In EQS, this structured-mean approach is accomplished through use of the V999 
constant to estimate the factor mean (Bentler, 1995). Dummy variables are expressed as 
exogenous latent variables with a single indicator and no residual. For further control, we assess 
direct links from the experimental factors to selection risk-taking to account for how these 
factors objectively change or influence the managerial decision-making. This was done to 
understand or isolate the real effects of the cognitive factors on selection risk taking. Supply 
chain experience is also freely estimated for its effect on selection risk-taking.  
Analysis was done with maximum likelihood estimation using the augmented moment 
matrix instead of the typical covariance matrices; this specification enables one to analyze the 
means of observed dependent variables as functions of the dummy experimental factors (Bagozzi 
& Yi, 1989). The process to test the effects of the three experimental factors involved 
constraining the paths of the exogenous factors equal to zero and then performing a Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) univariate chi-square test to determine if releasing the zero-value path constraint 
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improved model fit. In this manner, the paths to perceived risk from sourcing category difficult 
(H1), sourcing category importance (H2), and contingent pay (H3), as well as the path to 
perceived supplier control from contingent pay (H4), were tested. The other paths were tested 
following standard SEM structural parameter significance tests. Because of our directional 
hypotheses and our low sample size relative to the number of parameters tested, we used a 
p<0.10 to indicate statistical significance. The overall model results are presented in Figure 4. 
The fit of the model is adequate with X
2
 = 60.132 (51) p=0.178, CFI = 0.973, GFI=0.924, 
RMSEA = 0.033 (0.000, 0.071).  
The first four hypotheses relate to the three experiment factors. Hypothesis 1 positing that 
sourcing category difficulty increases perceived risk is supported (β = 0.326, p<0.01). 
Hypothesis 2 positing that sourcing category importance increases perceived risk is also 
supported (β = 0.178, p<0.10).  Hypothesis 3 positing that contingent pay decreases perceived 
risk is not supported as the LM test did not detect a significant univariate chi-square 
improvement (2=0.789 (1) p>.10, represented as “n.s.” in Figure 4). Hypothesis 4 positing that 
contingent pay increases perceived supplier control is supported (β = 0.234, p<0.01). Thus, three 
of the four hypothesized experimental factor effects are supported, indicating how the situational 
context influences perceptions during supplier selection. 
The remaining hypotheses investigate the relationships among cognitive processes and  
selection risk taking. Hypothesis 5 positing that  perceived supplier control decreases perceived 
risk is supported (β = -0.218, p<0.10). However, Hypothesis 6 positing that risk propensity 
decreases perceived risk is not supported (β = -0.105, p>0.10). Hypothesis 7 positing that 
perceived risk decreases selection risk taking is supported (β = -0.202, p<0.05); as is Hypothesis 
8 positing that risk propensity increases selection risk taking (β = 0.567, p<0.01). The above 
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results suggest that while risk perception is influential in supplier selection behavior, 
concomitant factors like perceptions of control and risk propensity diminish risk perception’s 
dominance in the cognitive model.  
Finally, to control for the direct effect of the experimental factors on selection risk-
taking, we performed the LM test as described above and we found no univariate evidence 
indicating such direct influence. To further verify this we allowed all experimental factors to 
freely relate to selection risk taking and the full model showed no significant improvement 
(2=0.838 (3),  p>0.10) with no substantial change in sign or significance of the parameters of 
interest. This result supports the importance of risk perception and propensity in selection risk-
taking. Interestingly, the relationship between supply chain experience and selection risk-taking 
is found to be significant (β = 0.129, p<0.10), suggesting that more experience in supply 
management leads managers to be more risk accepting in selection decision-making. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 here 
----------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we theorized and largely confirmed that sourcing category characteristics, the 
manner of compensation, and personal risk propensity influences a manager making a supplier 
selection under uncertainty. Our study supports the applicability of behavioral decision theory 
and the behavioral agency model in a supply chain context, and provides a cognitive and 
behavioral model that can be built upon by future research. In addition, several theoretical 
implications result from our findings. 
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We found that participants, who predominantly were practicing supply chain managers, 
generally avoid selecting a supplier with less certain outcomes even when that supplier possesses 
higher expected returns. This result suggests there may be general risk-aversion in managers 
when selecting supply partners. Uncertainty may be interpreted as unreliability, and many supply 
managers are likely to be extra sensitive to hints of insecure supply continuity (Goldfeld, 1999). 
Of course, uncertainty avoidance may come at the expense of innovations and rewards (Tomlin, 
2006), which is part of the context of this study.  
Our empirical modeling results reveal that both sourcing category difficulty and 
importance lead to perceptions of risk in the selection situation. That is, categories that are either 
deemed more important or more difficult are perceived as more problematic than components 
that are less so. In the case of category importance, supply managers likely view greater threats, 
both for the firm and personally, as the criticality of the category to the business in terms of its 
cost and the extent to which the business relies on the category increases. The importance and 
criticality of the category implies that there is little slack or room for failure. A supply failure 
will be highly consequential to the business because of its impact on critical organizational need, 
thus, increasing the decision-maker’s perception of risk for such categories. In the case of 
category difficulty, the perceived possibility of problems likely increases, leading managers to 
perceive higher risks. The novelty of the category and the complexity involved in sourcing a 
difficult purchase category create a problematic sourcing context because of the uncertainties 
involved. Thus, it may not be feasible for a supply manager to quickly or easily implement 
contingencies when disruptions to the supply of a difficult purchase category occur, thereby 
increasing the supply manager’s perception of risk.  
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Our findings builds on the work of  Ellis et al. (2010) who found that that sourcing 
characteristics classified  as difficult and important increase risk perceptions.  Whilst Ellis et al. 
(2010) investigated risk perception in a currently supplied component, we show that risks are 
perceived prior to establishing a supply partner. In other words, we show that supply managers 
are likely to be aware of, or at least perceiving of, potential threats before entering into supply 
arrangements based on the classifications of the intended purchase categories. If true, such a 
reality will oblige them to choose either to accept or avoid such risk in selecting suppliers for 
different categories. Our study points to the possibility that various conditions in the supplier 
selection decision reveal potential hazards to supply managers prior to making their decision. 
Contrary to our expectations, we found no significant link between contingent pay and 
risk perceptions. Prior work has inferred that compensation schemes directly influence the 
threats supply managers perceive, both for the firm and personally, when making decision for 
their company (Villena et al., 2009). We don’t find a direct link to risk perceptions. This suggests 
that decision makers do not expect less wealth with a higher proportion of contingent pay; their 
sense of risk seems unaffected by compensation scheme. While this implies either confidence in 
the ability to attain bonuses or a lack of confidence in retaining a high base salary, contingent 
pay is not shown to have a direct bearing on how much risk a supply manager perceives in 
supplier selection.  
Yet, we find that the proportion of contingent pay increases perceived supplier control. 
Contingent pay gives an illusion of control even though the facts suggest otherwise. As the name 
implies, contingent pay is designed to depend on the decision maker’s behavior, thus giving the 
decision maker a sense of control. The more a supply manager’s pay depends on the results of a 
manager’s decision, such as when PPV compensation mechanisms exist, the more the illusion 
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that the manager has post-decisional control over consequences of supplier selections. Firms 
should consider these, perhaps, unintended consequences when designing compensation 
schemes, particularly because we also found that perceived supplier control decreases perceived 
risk. Managers are less likely to see a supplier selection decision as a risky situation if they 
believe that they have post-decisional control over their decisions (Pitz, 1992). In other words, a 
manager may have an erroneous belief that consequences of a supplier selection can be reversed 
over time. Analogously, just as consumers may purchase a retail item with uncertain reliability 
because they believe the item can be returned, managers may discount the downside aspects of a 
supplier selection situation if they believe problems can be efficiently corrected – such as 
through renegotiations or development. Thus, perceived post-decisional control is likely to 
encourage more risk taking (i.e., accepting) in supplier selections. 
Our results also show that perceived risk decreases selection risk taking, which is in line 
with previous studies that investigated similar links in other contexts (Sitkin and Weingart, 
1995). This result shows that when cognitive and behavioral factors induce perceptions of risk in 
an uncertain supplier selection situation, managers will tend to choose a supplier with more 
predictable outcomes in order to protect themselves as agents and to protect the firm. The 
converse is suggestive –– cognitive factors that reduce risk perceptions can lead toward selecting 
uncertain suppliers that increase the likelihood of supply disruptions. Zsidisin and Wagner 
(2010) have found that supply chain resiliency practices reduce risk perceptions even in the 
presence of high supply disruptions.  These implications may explain why firms continue to 
discover risks in their supply base. 
Finally, we find that risk propensity increases selection risk taking in line with Sitkin and 
Pablo’s (1992) arguments, suggesting that the willingness to bear risks for the possibility of 
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gains induces supply managers to select uncertain suppliers (Kocabasoglu, Prahinski, & Klassen, 
2007). This finding, however, contradicts Sitkin and Weingart (1995) who found that the effect 
of risk propensity on risk taking was fully mediated by risk perception. Sitkin and Weingart’s 
(1995) study suggests that managers with high risk propensity would make supplier selection 
decision solely based on how they perceive the inherent risks. By contrast, our study finds that 
supply managers’ biases (risk propensity) could influence how they make decisions regardless of 
how they perceive inherent risks. In other words, we find a direct link between risk propensity 
and supplier selection risk taking. Unlike Sitkin and Weingart, who tested their model in a piece-
meal fashion, we used a more comprehensive structural approach that provided a true test of 
relationships among interconnected variables. Indeed, the direct link between risk propensity and 
risk taking suggests that, other than risk perception, there are underlying processes through 
which risk propensity affects risk taking that requires further examination.  
Our study makes multiple contributions to literature. First, our study confirms the 
relationship between risk perception and risk-taking behavior in supplier selection, extending the 
results of previous studies (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; Ellis et al. 2010) and underscoring the 
importance of managerial risk perceptions in supply management. Second, our finding that 
sourcing category importance and difficulty change a manager’s risk perception reveals that 
cognitive processes play an important role sting as supply managers make key decisions in their 
supply chains. Third, our integration of perceived supplier control extends Shapira’s (1995) 
concept of post-decisional control into risky supplier selection behavior, and takes a nascent step 
in addressing how to incorporate the concept into decision science literature. Fourth, the concept 
of post-decisional control was specifically linked with contingent pay to show how the BAM can 
be extended to incorporate the illusions of control concept – a variable often neglected in 
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decision theory research. Finally, our finding that relates risk propensity to selection risk taking 
builds on previous studies that investigated the determinants of decision-making under 
uncertainty, thus, representing an extension into the supply chain context. In particular, contrary 
to previous assumptions about how supply managers make decisions, it underscores that 
psychological characteristics help explain why supply managers accept or avoid suppliers with 
more uncertainty. 
 
 
 
Managerial Implications 
Our findings highlight the importance of categorizing components in supply management, giving 
supply chain executives some insight into what unexpected factors might influence supplier 
selection decisions in different situations. In particular, this study highlights the role that 
characteristics of a sourcing category play in how risk is perceived as an antecedent of 
subsequent supplier selections. Because the “difficulty” category influenced perceived risk, 
managers may be less willing to take risks when selecting suppliers for novel or purchase 
categories that are difficult to source. Interestingly, because competitors are also likely to face 
such difficulties and also less likely to take risks,  opportunities to potentially gain competitive 
advantage by being more risk accepting when selecting suppliers for such categories may be 
missed. Thus, managers should not simply be put off by the seemingly negative consequential 
effects of a difficult purchase category when making supplier selection decisions. Similarly, 
when purchase categories are classified as “important,” managers may be less willing to take 
risks when selecting suppliers since they may perceive risks with such purchase categories. The 
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implications of these key findings is that supply managers are cognitively affected by both the 
firm’s external and supply market complicatedness, and by the firm’s internal and strategic 
ramifications of making the correct supplier selection. Therefore, supply managers should take 
these cognitive processes into account in order to assure that selection decisions are being made 
for the appropriate reasons. 
Our study also highlights the need for clarity regarding how compensation schemes affect 
supply chain managers. As we have shown, contingent pay affects the cognitive processes 
leading to risk taking. Although our findings comport with Villena et al.’s (2009) empirical 
results, we find that contingent pay indirectly affects perceived risk through control perception, 
rather than directly affecting perceived risk. Although more study is required in this area, our 
results show that compensation schemes that firms use to influence managerial behavior may 
induce unintended cognitive biases. Rewarding based on contingent pay must be closely 
monitored to ensure that managers understand the limits of their responsibilities and power as 
regards post-decisional situations.  
Finally, the fact that the risk propensity of managers influences decision-making under 
uncertainty has implications in terms risk taking in supply management. Sitkin and Weingart 
(1995) imply that managers take risk mostly because they are unaware that risks exist. Moreover, 
supply chain literature tends to view supply managers as risk-averse – choosing to avoid risks 
when they can (Tomlin, 2006). Our descriptive analysis supports this notion that supply chain 
managers generally prefer to avoid selecting alternatives involving uncertainty. However, our 
results also show that their risk acceptance is closely tied with their personal risk propensity. The 
implication is that as risk propensity increases, uncertain suppliers become more attractive even 
though managers are aware of the downside potential. Supply chain experience does not counter-
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act this effect. At issue is the trade-off between potential rewards and losses. Numerous supply 
chain studies highlight the competitive advantage attainable through leveraging supplier 
capabilities. Yet the outcomes from leveraging suppliers are not certain, meaning more risk. 
Some managers in our study appear to be comfortable accepting a degree of uncertainty. 
Analytical studies have suggested conditions where accepting uncertain suppliers is optimal 
(Tomlin, 2006). Yet, the extent to which risk propensity is beneficial remains empirically 
undetermined. If risk propensity is shown to be a valuable trait, it has an implication for resource 
allocation, employee selection, recruitment, and development. In sum, our study highlights the 
need for understanding the cognitive and behavioral processes involved before trying to improve 
supply manager decision-making. 
 
Limitations and Future Studies  
There are several limitations to this study that must be highlighted in order to motivate future 
research. First, as with all laboratory experiments, our study created an artificial environment in 
which situations could be completely controlled. Real world settings are harder to control and 
more dangerous for the participants, but future quasi-experimentation in the field setting may be 
possible by manipulating some factors in a true supplier selection situation without allowing a 
final decision to be made. In effect, this would extend the time to make the supplier selection, but 
could give valuable insights to the participants as well as the researchers. Furthermore, we 
recognize that there is a possibility that managers might not fully understand the descriptions of 
the experimental factors and other measurements items leading to potential validity issues. In the 
experimental design we tried as much as possible to ensure the validity of our constructs. For 
example, we pre-tested the experimental instruments and refined the instruments based on the 
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results of our testing. We tried to simplify the description of the experimental factors and also 
presented them in a 2X2 matrix to ensure that responding managers would have no difficulty 
understanding the meaning of the related constructs. Nevertheless, we recognize that there is still 
a possibility of validity issues, thus, future studies must take extra steps to assure the validity of 
the measurement items. Second, while our measurement model provided high reliability within 
our study, future research could consider other factors affecting risk perceptions (e.g. time 
pressure or the presence of contingency plans), and more items per factor in order to develop 
even richer cognitive models. For example, it could be argued that the existence of contingency 
plans for a purchase category could potentially decrease risk perception for selecting suppliers 
for that category. However, we believe that the existence of contingency plans is more likely to 
affect actual behavior and not risk perception. For example, a manager may perceive that risks 
exist for a difficult purchase category, but his/her actions may or may not actually reflect the risk 
perceived because of the belief that contingencies exist. Nevertheless, we believe that the 
question of whether contingency plans have effect on risk perception and/or decision-making 
behavior when such plans are associated with different purchase categories represents an 
intriguing question and should be investigated in future studies. 
 
Third, this was a one-shot experiment with no performance feedback. Although no learning 
theory or Bayesian-type updating were integral for this study, future work examining the 
dynamic learning or knowledge-gaining effects of managers making supplier selections under 
uncertainty should test the stability of our model and add insights. Finally, supplier selections are 
not always the decision of a single individual. Often, strategic sourcing teams collectively 
interview and choose among suppliers. Although our study is limited to the within-person 
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influential factors, future work should study the between-person, team-level processes –– such as 
group-think –– that influence supplier selection behavior under uncertainty.  
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APPENDIX A: TEXT ANALYSIS OF MANAGERIAL RATIONALES 
 
Participants were asked to provide a rationale for their supplier selection. Comments 
were aggregated into two texts: those selecting Supplier A versus Supplier B. Participants 
selecting Supplier B were 40% more verbose. A latent analysis of the comments indicated that 
those choosing Supplier B were more likely to use numerical arguments. In addition, as shown in 
Table A1, participants selecting Supplier B focused almost exclusively on its benefits –– 
focusing on opportunities –– while giving little support for not selecting Supplier A. In contrast, 
participants selecting Supplier A took efforts to highlight both the upside of Supplier A and the 
downside of Supplier B. 
 
 
Table A1: Supplier-Associated Descriptors within each Characterization-Selection Combination 
 Characterizations of Supplier A Characterizations of Supplier B 
 
Descriptor Count 
Frequency within 
combination Descriptor Count 
Frequency within 
combination 
Participants 
selecting 
Supplier A 
Less risk a 21 32% More risk a 9 28% 
Guarantee b 11 17% Larger chance b 5 16% 
Consistent b 9 14% Costly 5 16% 
Stable b 8 12% Risky a 5 16% 
Predictable b 5 8% Gamble b 1 3% 
Certain b 3 5% Less reliable b 1 3% 
Reliable b 3 5% Sporadic b 1 3% 
Proven b 2 3% Threatening a 1 3% 
Better record 1 2% Too risky a 1 3% 
Less sporadic a 1 2% Unpredictable b 1 3% 
More value 1 2% Variance b 1 3% 
   Disruptive 1 3% 
       
 
Participants 
selecting 
Supplier B 
Consistent b 2 50% 
More opportunities/ 
potential c 12 29% 
Distrustful 1 25% More risk a 7 17% 
Reliable b 1 25% Innovative c 4 10% 
   More reward c 4 10% 
   More value c 3 7% 
   More upside c 2 5% 
   Often on-time c 2 5% 
   Quality 2 5% 
   Worth the risk a 2 5% 
   Adaptive c 1 2% 
   Some risk a 1 2% 
   Sporadic 1 2% 
a Words indicating Supplier-B has higher risk, b Words indicating Supplier-B has higher uncertainty, c Words indicating 
Supplier-B has higher opportunities 
 
 
Further, the two texts were analyzed using centering resonance analysis (CRA) (Corman, 
Kuhn, McPhee, & Dooley, 2002; Corman & Dooley, 2006), parsing noun phrases to create word 
networks that, based on graph and linguistic theories, show coherency through backwards and 
forwards connection of noun phrases (Grosz, Weinstein, & Joshi, 1995). CRA measures the 
importance of a word via its betweeness centrality. Respondents who chose Supplier B were over 
50% more coherent in their collective comments (as measured by the overall “betweeness” 
centrality of the CRA network) than those who chose Supplier A. Also, arguments of those 
choosing Supplier B were less diverse than the arguments of those choosing Supplier A. In 
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comments from those choosing Supplier A, the most influential words were “risk”, “Supplier-
A”, “Supplier-B”, “delivery”, and “cost”. Conversely, the most influential words in comments 
from those choosing Supplier B were “Supplier-B”, “cost”, “good”, “order”, and “risk”. By 
comparing the two networks we further found that “guarantee-reduction-year” and “low-supply-
risk” were influential word triads that existed only in Supplier A comments; while “expected-
cost-benefit,” “high reward,” and “good responsiveness” were unique to Supplier B comments. 
 Collectively these results suggest that those choosing Supplier B –– the more uncertain 
choice –– were more likely to be verbose in their explanation, use numerical arguments, and 
highlight the potential positive outcomes associated with the choice. Those choosing Supplier A 
were more likely to cite risk as the main reason for not choosing Supplier B. In other words, 
those choosing the more uncertain outcome seemed to acknowledge the uncertainty and be more 
concerned about voicing a strong argument in support of choosing Supplier B, while those 
choosing the more certain outcome acknowledged the opportunity of the more uncertain choice 
but said the downside risk was not acceptable, and therefore they could not choose Supplier B. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Nominal Definitions of Constructs Used in the Proposed Model 
Construct 
Name 
Nominal Definition Additional Notes 
Sourcing 
Category 
Difficulty 
The extent to which potential 
problems exist due to the 
characteristics of the product, 
environment, and supply market of a 
sourced component (Kraljic, 1983; 
Olsen & Ellram, 1997) 
Difficult purchases present threats to the firm and 
problems to the manager in assuring proper component 
supply (Goldfeld, 1999) 
Sourcing 
Category 
Importance 
The extent to which a sourced 
component is critical to the firm’s core 
competence or is of high cost relative 
to total firm costs (Kraljic, 1983; 
Olsen & Ellram, 1997) 
Important purchases can have substantial organizational 
consequences and can raise expectations for the manager 
in terms of influencing firm performance (Puto, 1987; 
McQuiston, 1989; Goldfeld, 1999) 
Proportion of 
Contingent 
Pay 
The proportion of pay relative to total 
compensation that is contingent on 
uncertain firm-level events such as 
performance outcomes (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998) 
The higher the contingent pay, the closer managerial 
compensation can be coupled to firm performance 
(Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Welbourne, 2007). 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Control 
The decision makers’ beliefs in their 
abilities to have post-decisional 
control over the consequences of their 
initial supplier selection behavior 
(Shapira, 1995). 
Perceptions of control have a strong influence on problem 
recognition, risk perceptions, and decision-making 
(Houghton, Simon, Aquino, & Goldberg, 2000; Keil et 
al., 2007). 
Perceived risk A decision maker’s overall assessment 
of the probabilities and magnitudes of 
potential losses associated with a 
supplier selection situation (Mitchell, 
1995; Ellis et al., 2010). 
Risk is perceived when there is uncertainty and when 
negative consequences are salient (Baird & Thomas, 
1990; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Because organizational 
buying poses threats to both the decision-maker and the 
firm (Hawes & Barnhouse, 1987), supplier selection risk 
perceptions are assumed to be a composite assessment 
(Mittal & Ross, 1998; Zsidisin, 2003). 
Risk 
Propensity 
The tendency of a decision maker to 
take or avoid risks (MacCrimmon & 
Wehrung, 1990) 
A high risk propensity discounts the downside or heavily 
weigh the upside potential of a situation (Krueger & 
Dickson, 1994; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Because risk 
propensity is a personal bias that can vary across contexts 
(Ghosh & Ray, 1992; Ghosh, 1994), assess it directly 
related to the context of interest (Blais & Weber, 2006). 
Selection 
Risk Taking 
The likelihood of a decision maker to 
select a supplier that is associated with 
more uncertainty – i.e., more risk but 
also more potential benefit (Case & 
Scott, 1998; Tomlin, 2006). 
Risk and uncertainty are highly related (Lipshitz & 
Strauss, 1997; Hult et al., 2010). High risk suppliers have 
greater uncertainty (cf. Chow & Haddad, 1991). Supplier 
selection risk taking relates to Sitkin and Pablo’s (1992) 
decision risk in that there is uncertainty about the 
potentially significant outcomes of decisions. 
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Table 2: Experimental Design 
 Experimental Factors Sourcing 
Category 
Scenario 
Sourcing Category 
Importance 
Sourcing 
Category 
Difficulty 
 
 
Contingent Pay 
1 L L N Routine 
2 L L Y Routine 
3 L H N Bottleneck 
4 L H Y Bottleneck 
5 H L N Leverage 
6 H L Y Leverage 
7 H H N Strategic 
8 H H Y Strategic 
 
 
Table 3: Scenario Variations in Sourcing Category Text  
 Low Importance High Importance 
High Difficulty Bottleneck: “Your senior buyer has 
informed you that this is a 
“bottleneck” category with low overall 
spend and low criticality to operations. 
However, it is a unique category that 
is not easily available – supply 
continuity is important. It has complex 
specifications and untested processes. 
Therefore, it must be managed by 
decreasing supplier uniqueness, 
marketplace scanning, and supplier 
development.” 
 
Strategic: Your senior buyer has 
informed you that this is a “strategic” 
category with high overall spend and 
high criticality to operations. Few 
qualified suppliers exist because it’s 
unique and complex. Quality is crucial. 
Partnerships with suppliers can help by 
increasing their design role. 
Contingency plans exist in case things 
go wrong. 
Low Difficulty Routine: “Your senior buyer has 
informed you that this is a “routine” 
category with low overall spend, low 
criticality to operations and ready 
availability. It has many small, 
individual transactions for everyday 
use; and provides an opportunity for 
savings by simplifying and reducing 
buying effort, eliminating small-
volume spend, and automating 
transactions.” 
 
Leverage: “Your senior buyer has 
informed you that this is a “leverage” 
category with high overall spend and 
high criticality to operations. It is 
readily available in the supply market, 
many alternatives, and ample 
inventories exist. There are 
opportunities for savings by 
maximizing commercial advantage, 
concentrating business, and 
maintaining competition among 
suppliers.” 
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Table 4: Measurement Model Results 
Construct Items 
Standardized 
Loading 
t-value 
Intercept 
Value 
Risk Propensity (=0.546
 a
, =0.541). Sources (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) 
In the above supplier selection scenario, if the decision is very 
important for your company’s success, rate your likelihood to - 
   
 Q2.08 choose a less risky supplier because it has a major 
impact on the company’s strategic direction (reverse) 
0.747
***
 5.672 2.676 
 Q2.09 strategically choose a supplier even though it may 
cause problems 
0.518
***
 4.508 3.509 
 Q2.10 Support a selection decision even though analyses 
were done that lacked significant information 
---   
Perceived Supplier Control (=0.735
 a
, =0.689): Sources (Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000; Forlani, 2002) 
 Q1.01 It appears I have very little control over what 
happens after I make the decision (reverse) 
0.648
***
 5.157 3.148 
 Q1.08 This situation allows me to actively engage with the 
supplier I select 
0.864
***
 5.994 3.667 
Risk Perception (=0.700
 a
, =0.705). Sources (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Ganzach, Ellis, Pazy, & Ricci-Siag, 2008) 
 Q1.04 There seems to be a lot of risk in this situation 0.648
***
 5.951 4.028 
 Q1.11 There is little risk in the decision I face here 
(reverse) 
0.658
***
 6.031 4.685 
 Q1.17 This scenario can be characterized as risky 0.676
***
 6.168 4.194 
Selection Risk Taking (=0.840
 a
, =0.841) 
 Q1.06 Supplier A is the better choice (reverse) 0.905
***
 9.578 3.019 
 Q1.13 I would probably select supplier B 0.807
***
 8.504 3.204 
 
Fit Statistics: 2 = 26.283 (26) p=0.447, CFI = 0.999, GFI=0.957, RMSEA = 0.010 (0.000, 0.077) 
* 
p<.0.10, 
** 
p<.0.05, 
*** 
p<.0.01, 
ais construct reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) 
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Table 5: Item Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
 Q1.01 Q1.04  Q1.06 Q1.08 Q1.11 Q1.13  Q1.17 Q2.08 Q2.09 
SCM 
Exp. 
          
Q1.01 1          
Q1.04  -.093 1         
Q1.06 .193
*
 -.101 1        
Q1.08 .526
**
 -.113 .256
**
 1       
Q1.11 .050 .455
**
 -.068 -.058 1      
Q1.13  .188
*
 -.184 .732
**
 .196
*
 -.159 1     
Q1.17 -.183 .439
**
 -.115 -.201
*
 .442
**
 -.155 1    
Q2.08 .148 -.080 .428
**
 .221
*
 -.069 .391
**
 -.045 1   
Q2.09 .233
*
 -.101 .278
**
 .140 -.186 .274
**
 -.066 .384
**
 1  
SCM Exp. .108 -.019 .177 .118 .055 .015 .029 .032 .188 1 
Mean 3.170 3.970 3.051 3.640 4.625 3.220 4.180 2.693 3.550 2.740
 a
 
Std. dev. 1.882 1.461 1.529 1.942 1.465 1.736 1.577 1.198 1.558 1.581 
a 1=1-5 yrs, 2=6-10yrs, 3=11-15 yrs, 4=16-20 yrs, 5=21-25 yrs, 6=26+ yrs 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
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Figure 2: Common Text Explaining Sourcing Categories 
 
 
  
49 
 
 
Figure 3: Example Hypothetical Situation of Supplier Selection
 a
 
 
a
 Web page example is Scenario 6 
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Figure 4: Structural Equation Model Results 
 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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